The Extroverted Firm: How External Information Practices Affect Innovation and Productivity

We gather detailed data on organizational practices and information technology (IT) use at 253 firms to examine the hypothesis that external focus—the ability of a firm to detect and therefore respond to changes in its external operating environment—increases returns to IT, especially when combined with decentralized decision making. First, using survey-based measures, we find that external focus is correlated with both organizational decentralization, and IT investment. Second, we find that a cluster of practices including external focus, decentralization, and IT is associated with improved product innovation capabilities. Third, we develop and test a three-way complementarities model that indicates that the combination of external focus, decentralization, and IT is associated with significantly higher productivity in our sample. We also introduce a new set of instrumental variables representing barriers to IT-related organizational change and find that our results are robust when we account for the potential endogeneity of organizational investments. Our results may help explain why firms that operate in information-rich environments such as high-technology clusters or areas with high worker mobility have experienced especially high returns to IT investment and suggest a set of practices that some managers may be able to use to increase their returns from IT investments.

Information Transmission and the Bullwhip Effect: An Empirical Investigation

The bullwhip effect is the amplification of demand variability along a supply chain: a company bullwhips if it purchases from suppliers more variably than it sells to customers. Such bullwhips (amplifications of demand variability) can lead to mismatches between demand and production and hence to lower supply chain efficiency. We investigate the bullwhip effect in a sample of 4,689 public U.S. companies over 1974–2008. Overall, about two-thirds of firms bullwhip. The sample's mean and median bullwhips, both significantly positive, respectively measure 15.8% and 6.7% of total demand variability. Put another way, the mean quarterly standard deviation of upstream orders exceeds that of demand by $20 million. We decompose the bullwhip by information transmission lead time. Estimating the bullwhip's information-lead-time components with a two-stage estimator, we find that demand signals firms observe with more than three-quarters' notice drive 30% of the bullwhip, and those firms observe with less than one-quarter's notice drive 51%. From 1974–1994 to 1995–2008, our sample's mean bullwhip dropped by a third.

Signaling Quality via Queues

We consider anM/M/1 queueing system with impatient consumers who observe the length of the queue before deciding whether to buy the product. The product may have high or low quality, and consumers are heterogeneously informed. The firm chooses a slow or (at a cost) a fast service rate. In equilibrium, informed consumers join the queue if it is below a threshold. The threshold varies with the quality of the good, so an uninformed consumer updates her belief about quality on observing the length of the queue. The strategy of an uninformed consumer has a “hole”: she joins the queue at lengths both below and above the hole, but not at the hole itself. We show that if the prior probability the product has high quality and the proportion of informed consumers are both low, a high-quality firm may select a slower service rate than a low-quality firm. The queue can therefore be a valuable signaling device for a high-quality firm. Strikingly, in some scenarios, the high-quality firm may choose the slow service rate even if the technological cost of speeding up is zero.

Rational Herding in Microloan Markets

Microloan markets allow individual borrowers to raise funding from multiple individual lenders. We use a unique panel data set that tracks the funding dynamics of borrower listings on Prosper.com, the largest microloan market in the United States. We find evidence of rational herding among lenders. Well-funded borrower listings tend to attract more funding after we control for unobserved listing heterogeneity and payoff externalities. Moreover, instead of passively mimicking their peers (irrational herding), lenders engage in active observational learning (rational herding); they infer the creditworthiness of borrowers by observing peer lending decisions and use publicly observable borrower characteristics to moderate their inferences. Counterintuitively, obvious defects (e.g., poor credit grades) amplify a listing's herding momentum, as lenders infer superior creditworthiness to justify the herd. Similarly, favorable borrower characteristics (e.g., friend endorsements) weaken the herding effect, as lenders attribute herding to these observable merits. Follow-up analysis shows that rational herding beats irrational herding in predicting loan performance.

Three-Way Complementarities: Performance Pay, Human Resource Analytics, and Information Technology

We test for three-way complementarities among information technology (IT), performance pay, and human resource (HR) analytics practices. We develop a principal–agent model examining how these practices work together as an incentive system that produces a larger productivity premium when the practices are implemented in concert rather than separately. We assess our model by combining fine-grained data on human capital management (HCM) software adoption over 11 years with detailed survey data on incentive systems and HR analytics practices for 189 firms. We find that the adoption of HCM software is greatest in firms that have also adopted performance pay and HR analytics practices. Furthermore, HCM adoption is associated with a large productivity premium when it is implemented as a system of organizational incentives, but has less benefit when adopted in isolation. The system of three-way complements produces disproportionately greater benefits than pairwise interactions, highlighting the importance of including all three complements. Productivity increases significantly when the HCM systems “go live” but not when they are purchased, which can be years earlier. This helps rule out reverse causality as an explanation for our findings.

The widespread adoption of activity-based costing enables firms to allocate common service costs to each customer, allowing for precise measurement of both the cost to serve a particular customer and the customer's profitability. In this paper, we investigate how pricing strategies based on customer cost information affects a firm's customer acquisition and retention dynamics, and ultimately its profit, using a two-period monopoly model with high- and low-cost customer segments. Although past purchase and cost information helps firms to increase profits through differential prices for good and bad customers in the second period (“price discrimination effect”), it can hurt firms because strategic forward-looking consumers may delay purchases to avoid higher future prices (“ratchet effect”). We find that when the customer cost heterogeneity is sufficiently large, it is optimal for firms to “fire” some of its high-cost customers, and customer cost-based pricing is profitable. Surprisingly, it is optimal to fire even some profitable customers. This result is robust even when the cost to serve is endogenous and determined by the consumer's choice of service level. We also shed insight on acquisition–retention dynamics, on when firms can improve their profitability by selectively firing known old “bad” customers, and on replacing the old “bad” customers with a mix of new “good” and “bad” customers.

Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Antisocial Motivations

Firms are often organized into groups. Group membership has been shown empirically to have positive effects, in the form of increased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. This includes an enhanced willingness to engage in altruistic punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and instead, out-group members are punished harder and regardless of whether they cooperate or defect. Our results point to a mechanism that might help explain previous mixed results on the social value of punishment, and they contribute to understanding the sources of conflict between groups. They also point to an important trade-off for firms: introducing competition enhances within-group efficiency but also generates costly between-group conflict.

Impact of Performance-Based Contracting on Product Reliability: An Empirical Analysis

Using a proprietary data set provided by a major manufacturer of aircraft engines, we empirically investigate how product reliability is impacted by the use of two different types of after-sales maintenance support contracts: time and material contracts (T&MC) and performance-based contracts (PBC). We offer a number of competing arguments based on the theory of incentives that establish why product reliability may increase or decrease under PBC. We build a two-stage econometric model that explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of contract choices, and find evidence of a positive and significant effect of PBC on product reliability. The estimation of our model indicates that product reliability is higher by 25%–40% under PBC compared to under T&MC, once the endogeneity of contract choice is taken into account. Our results are consistent with two mechanisms for reliability improvement under PBC: more frequent scheduled maintenance and better care performed in each maintenance event.

Dynamics of Rate-of-Return Regulation

Under rate-of-return regulation, a firm's product prices are constrained by the requirement that investors not earn more than an allowable return on the firm's assets. This paper examines the dynamic properties of the rate-of-return regulation process when the regulated firm periodically undertakes new capacity investments. Our analysis identifies prices that correspond to stationary values of the regulation process. It is shown that the underlying depreciation rules for property, plant, and equipment determine whether these stationary prices will be above, equal to, or below the long-run marginal cost of providing the regulated service. We provide conditions under which the rate-of-return regulation process is dynamically stable so that prices indeed converge to their stationary values. The overall efficiency of this regulation method is shown to depend on how well the applicable depreciation schedule matches the productivity pattern of the assets in use.

Consistency Judgments, Embeddedness, and Relationship Outcomes in Interorganizational Networks

Past research has shown how outcomes in interorganizational relationships are influenced by the characteristics of the individual relationship in question. Focusing on relationships between suppliers and their organizational buyers, we augment this perspective by positing that relationship outcomes are also influenced by social comparison processes involving perceptions of a supplier's practices across comparable buyer relationships. Based on past research on embedded ties and institutional theory, we propose that the effect of these comparison processes depends on the nature of a buyer's existing interorganizational ties and on the norms that are brought to bear on the relationship in question. We test our propositions based on 788 observations of organizational buyers who have relationships with the same supplier. Our findings paint a complex, multilevel picture of the process by which relationship outcomes come about in interorganizational networks.

Modeling Purchasing Behavior with Sudden “Death”: A Flexible Customer Lifetime Model

This study proposes a new customer lifetime model: the gamma/Gompertz distribution (G/G). The advantage of this model relative to the well-known Pareto distribution is twofold: (i) its probability density function can exhibit a mode at zero or an interior mode, and (ii) it can be skewed to the right or to the left. We combine the G/G with a negative binomial distribution (NBD) and obtain the moments of the distribution of the number of transactions over (0,T] and (T,T+T^*]. Out of six data sets, the G/G/NBD model provides a notable improvement in the log-likelihood over the Pareto/NBD model in four data sets. It can indicate substantial differences in expected residual lifetimes compared to the Pareto/NBD and induce a retention rather than acquisition policy. On the average, the G/G/NBD exhibits slightly better forecasts of the mean number of transactions than the Pareto/NBD.

Relicensing as a Secondary Market Strategy

Secondary markets in the information technology industry, where used or refurbished equipment is traded, have been growing steadily. For original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in this industry, the importance of secondary markets has grown in parallel, not only as a source of revenue, but also because of their impact on these firms' competitive advantage and market strategy. Recent articles in the press have severely criticized some OEMs who are perceived to be actively trying to eliminate the secondary market for their products. Other OEMs have policies that enhance their secondary markets. The goal of this paper is to understand how an OEM's incentives and optimal strategies vis-à-vis the secondary market are shaped contingent on her relative competitive advantage, product characteristics, and consumer preferences. The critical trade-off that we examine is whether the indirect benefit from maintaining an active secondary market (the resale value effect) can outweigh the potentially negative effect of the sales of used products at the expense of new product sales (the cannibalization effect). To that end, we develop a durable good model where the OEM can directly affect the resale value of her product through a relicensing fee charged to the buyer of the refurbished equipment. We analyze the OEM's strategy in both the monopoly and the duopoly cases, characterize the optimal relicensing fee set by the OEM, and draw conclusions on the conditions that favor stimulating or deterring the secondary market.